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Trial by Media: An Empirical Investigation of Corporate 
Reputation and Stock Returns in Australia 
 
Elisabeth Sinnewe & Scott J. Niblock* 
Southern Cross Business School 
Southern Cross University 
Gold Coast QLD Australia 
 
This paper examines whether investors are able to generate abnormal risk-
adjusted returns in the Australian market based on media-specific firm 
reputational factors under market uncertainty between 2004 and 2012. Our 
findings suggest that after controlling for crisis-centric time periods and market 
risk factors, contrarian trading strategies produce abnormal returns for poor 
corporate reputation firms but not for their good corporate reputation counterparts. 
Corporate reputation may be a driver of performance for poorly performing 
Australian firms and could be considered a stimulus for trading activity due to its 
explanatory capabilities. 
 
Historically, considerable effort has been devoted to understanding movements in stock 
market prices that are not explained by conventional financial theory (Morris & Shin, 2002). 
Explaining the behaviour of stock prices that cannot be accounted for by economic 
information has been problematic due to the inability to identify and accurately measure 
relevant non-quantifiable factors (Ferguson et al., 2013). For example, how do we know 
whether media coverage influences the market’s response, or whether some unobserved facet 
of the story simultaneously drives both media coverage and market response? (Engelberg & 
Parson, 2011; Jang, 2007) 
                                                            
* Correspondence should be addressed to Scott Niblock, Southern Cross Business School, Southern Cross 
University, Southern Cross Drive, Bilinga, QLD, 4225, Australia. E-mail: scott.niblock@scu.edu.au. This paper 
is dedicated to the memory of Pieter van Hooff. The authors would like to thank Prof. Terry Walter, Prof. Ian 
Eddie, Dr Michael Kortt and the CRN program for their assistance. Data provided by SIRCA is also gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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One goal of media is to broadly disseminate relevant information via different outlets 
(e.g., print and digital media) to the investment community. Given mass media’s broad reach 
(which is certainly far broader than corporate and analyst reports and other firm-specific 
disclosures), information revealed through the media may influence investor decision-making 
(Sadique et al., 2008). For instance, Fang & Peress (2009) claim that 55 million newspaper 
copies (not including online subscriptions) are sold to individual readers in the US, which is 
approximately 20% of the nation’s population. Further, unobserved features that are 
generated through second-hand circulation of information by the media may convey a 
favourable or unfavourable image of the covered firm; and thus, shape corporate reputation1 
(Tong, 2013).  
The literature (Barber & Odean, 2008; Eccles & Vollbracht, 2006; Frieder & 
Subrahmanyam, 2005; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2013) suggests 
that firms with low reputational risk and positive emotional responses in the media are more 
likely to enjoy greater financial performance and that corporate reputation is positively 
associated with investor returns. However, numerous questions remain unanswered regarding 
corporate reputation and financial markets. For instance, does corporate reputation (i.e., 
framing of firms vis-à-vis good news/bad news media coverage) affect stock price 
performance? Can corporate reputation be used to identify well-performing investments? And 
can investors generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns from this information?2  
While previous studies (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 
2005) have examined the link between corporate reputation and return performance, it needs 
to be borne in mind that they rely on corporate reputation rankings that are not readily 
                                                            
1 We follow Deephouse (2000, p. 1099) in defining corporate reputation as “the overall evaluation of a firm 
presented in the media”. 
2 We define abnormal returns here as the intercepts from excess return regressions estimated in a multi-factor 
capital asset pricing model. This definition has been commonly employed in the Finance literature (see e.g., 
Fama & French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Davis, 2001; Sensoy, 2009). 
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available for Australian listed firms. Against this background, we examine the role of the 
media in financial markets by examining an investment strategy specifically based on 
Australian corporate reputation.  
In lieu of corporate reputation rankings we develop a new ‘measure of media tone’ to 
assess the corporate reputation of Australian firms. By doing so this allows dissecting 
whether market response to media is driven by an underlying unobservable construct, such as 
corporate reputation (Engelberg & Parson, 2011). Specifically, we consider whether a trading 
strategy based on the corporate reputation of S&P ASX 200 listed companies in the media 
can earn excess risk-adjusted returns. We also contrast the pay-off of a corporate reputation 
trading strategy during different degrees of market stress. Empirical evidence suggests that 
managed funds underperform during changing market conditions due to inertial behaviour of 
fund managers who remain to bear the full brunt of falling markets (Ben-David et al., 2012). 
Also, Wisniewski & Lambe (2013) claim that investors acting on negative sentiment in the 
media can improve their investment performance. Taken together, there is valid cause to 
compare the profitability of this trading strategy across divergent economic conditions.  
The study adds to our understanding of the association of investment returns and corporate 
reputation by building on the work of Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008). The main 
contribution of our paper is the development of a corporate reputation measure that quantifies 
how companies are presented (‘framed’) in the media. This further contributes to the efficient 
market and investor sentiment hypotheses, as we are able to empirically examine whether 
affective tone influences share price performance (which differs to Tetlock (2007) and 
Tetlock et al., (2008) who examine market sentiment not individual firm reputation). We also 
examine the relationship between corporate reputation and stock returns under different 
economic conditions, showing that divergent market conditions can moderate the effect of 
corporate reputation on stock returns. To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
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empirically examines the effect of corporate reputation on stock returns of Australian 
companies across divergent economic conditions, addressing a noticeable absence in the 
literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of 
the literature and establishes the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
empirical approach adopted in the study. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
discusses the implications of our findings. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate Reputation Conveyed in the Media 
The term ‘corporate reputation’ is based on the idea that stakeholders’ beliefs and evaluations 
of a company will be shaped by information received through the media (Deephouse, 2000). 
Indeed, the resource-based view suggests that a firm’s reputation in the media may be best 
understood as a strategic intangible asset based on broad public recognition of the high 
quality of its capabilities and outputs, leading to sustained competitive advantage and 
increased performance (Deephouse, 2000; King & Whetten, 2008; Rindova et al., 2005).  
Although corporate information presented in the news is backward looking, the ‘tone’ and 
‘spin’ of textual information accompanying the numbers can be inherently forward looking 
(Sadique et al., 2008). The tone employed by the writer of the news story pertains to the use 
of positive/optimistic, neutral or negative/pessimistic words. The spin placed on news stories 
relates to the editor’s positioning of information (e.g., whether to include or exclude 
news/information, first page or last, first paragraph or last, etc). Thus, the semantic content of 
media news articles may be able to indirectly provide state of mind constituencies, qualitative 
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descriptions of future performance and valuable insights that quantitative economic 
fundamentals cannot (Ferguson et al., 2013).  
Corporate Reputation & Financial Markets 
So how is corporate reputation perceived by market participants through the media? Research 
(Deephouse, 2000; Rindova et al., 2005) suggests that reputation in the media reflects 
collective recognition of a firm’s ‘demonstrated ability’ to create value. Frieder & 
Subrahmanyam (2005) and Barber & Odean (2008) show that individuals are more likely to 
buy stock with strong brand recognition and that are ‘attention-grabbing’ in the news under 
the premise that they face difficulties when choosing which stock to buy from a large 
investment universe. Moreover, firms with low reputational risk and positive emotional 
responses in the media are more likely to enjoy underlying capabilities that produce 
consistent patterns of behaviour and performance (Barber & Odean, 2008; Eccles & 
Vollbracht, 2006; Frieder & Subrahmanyam, 2005; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; 
Wei et al., 2013).   Pfarrer et al., (2010) argue that this collective recognition of the ability to 
produce value regularly can moderate uncertainty even for stakeholders who lack experience 
with a firm, suggesting that high reputation firms encounter lesser penalties for negative news 
than firms with poor reputations.  
Eccles & Vollbracht (2006) also claim that while companies cannot control media 
agendas, they can improve the understanding and perception of their operations by the public 
and strengthen their overall reputation. The fact that adverse events that affect corporate 
reputation, such as corporate accidents, are associated with increased media attention and a 
negative share price reaction highlights the need to assess corporate reputation and return 
performance (Wei et al., 2013).   
Traditional finance theory suggests that trading on second-hand information circulated by 
the media should be a futile investment exercise. Fama’s (1998) Efficient Market Hypothesis 
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(EMH) in the semi-strong form posits that current prices reflect all publicly available 
information, so that media coverage should have no effect on future market activity. If one 
supposes that the media contains no new or useful information about past, present and future 
cash flows, then one would not anticipate any impact of corporate reputation on stock market 
performance. 
However, there are empirical findings that question the information efficiency of financial 
markets, which lead researchers to reconsider the association between news coverage and 
asset prices. Empirical studies (Dyck & Zingales, 2003; Feng & Peress, 2009; Ferguson et al., 
2013; Sadique et al., 2008; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008) have used qualitative textual 
analysis (via sophisticated linguistic algorithms) and trading strategies to examine the media 
effect  on stock market performance. The collective findings suggest that by addressing the 
semantics of linguistics employed in news articles, it may be possible to gauge stock market 
reactions to such language and measure the effects of news events on stock returns. 
According to Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008), these findings are reflected within 
theoretical models of investor sentiment and non-informational trading, in which non-rational 
traders depress stock prices in the short-run.  
Given the alleged importance of a firm’s representation in media outlets, we extend on this 
strand of research by examining the framing of companies by the media, i.e., the conveyed 
reputation by the media. It warrants further investigation into whether the affective language 
used in news stories can in fact influence return performance of listed companies. Both under 
the efficient market hypothesis, as well as under the investor sentiment theory, corporate 
reputation does not affect return performance but for different reasons: Any short-run share 
price changes arising from investor sentiment revert to fundamental equity values in the long-
run, whereas under the efficient market hypothesis affective language will not affect stock 
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returns unless it bears information that it is not yet reflected in stock prices. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize:   
H1: Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm’s corporate 
reputation. 
Another strand of research considers that media selectively focusses on certain types of 
information in certain economic conditions (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). This selectivity can 
affect stock returns. For example, Wisniewski & Lambe (2013) demonstrate that media 
reports can influence the future movements of stock prices during periods of economic 
uncertainty. They show that an increase in media pessimism during the financial crisis 
induces a statistically significant response in the future returns on banking stocks. Their 
results suggest that an active trading strategy focussing on how companies are framed in the 
media may in fact yield risk-adjusted trading gains in a period of increased uncertainty.    
Intense turbulence in the financial markets may cause increased uncertainty amongst 
investors, resulting in informational efficiency to deteriorate creating a permanent effect of an 
otherwise short-run phenomenon.  We therefore extend on this notion by contrasting the 
performance of our trading strategy across three phases: prior, during and after the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008:3  
H2: Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm’s corporate 
reputation before crisis events. 
H3: Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm’s corporate 
reputation during crisis events. 
H4: Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm’s corporate 
reputation after crisis events. 
                                                            
3 Lehman Brothers (a large US investment bank) filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, 
largely due to the US sub-prime mortgage and global credit derivative market collapse. Arguably, the sub-prime 
credit crisis was well underway before this event and escalated in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ demise, 
creating great uncertainty and extreme market volatility during this period. 
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DATA & METHODS 
Data & General Approach 
We commence our data collection process with the S&P ASX 200 index constituents as of 31 
December 2003. We chose the S&P ASX 200 index as our sample frame for three reasons: 
(1) Firms listed on the ASX 200 make up 78% of the market capitalisation of the entire 
Australian stock market; (2) Barber & Odean (2008) show that individual investors are more 
likely to invest in large well-known firms; and (3) ASX 200 or ‘Large-cap’ funds are 
prominent in Australia.  
From this dataset, only companies that remain listed during the total period are considered 
(i.e., January 2004 to December 2012), yielding a sample of 87 companies. Nine companies 
of the initial sample of 87 firms experienced a significant change in business arrangement 
during the sample period, meaning that no news coverage was available on the Factiva 
database prior to the change. These firms were excluded from the sample to ensure that an 
analysis of the firm’s corporate reputation is reliable through time. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of firms in the sample by industry sector, based on two-digit GICS codes. The 
figure shows that our sample distribution ranges across a number of different sectors with a 
relatively strong presence of Financials and Materials companies with 28.2% and 19.2% 
respectively. This is expected given the high concentration of stocks in these sectors relative 
to other sectors in the ASX 200 (Alcock & Hatherley, 2009).  
We require firms to be listed for the entire time span to avoid bias due to initial public 
offer (IPO) underperformance or de-listing. It should also be noted that this requirement 
places more emphasis on larger firms within the sample. Since this selection process exposes 
the sample to potential full-data survivorship bias, we test for a significant return difference 
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of the complete ASX 200 firms (as listed on 31 December 2003) and our sample, but find 
none.4 
Our next step is to collect relevant company news stories for the purpose of computing 
reputational measures. The news stories are obtained from the Factiva database for a period 
of nine consecutive years from January 2003 to December 2011. We restrict the sample to 
compute the media tone score to the top 100 yearly news stories ranked by relevance for each 
company, as we want to avoid news articles, in which the company is only mentioned in 
passing. This may distort the reputational score for this company. For example, if an article 
reports on a corporate accident by BHP and mentions Rio Tinto as its main competitor, then 
it would be distorting to use this news story to measure Rio Tinto’s reputation. Therefore 
relevance ranking reflects how prominent a company features in a news article.  
The search encompasses all Australian news sources ranging from online news wires (e.g., 
Australian Associated Press (AAP), Bloomberg, Reuters, etc) to print media (e.g., Australian 
Financial Review, Sydney Morning Herald, The Australian, The Age, etc) to which investors 
may have access. We limit the sample of news coverage to the top 100 most relevant news 
articles, as psychological research suggests that attention is a limited resource and visual 
searches are difficult (Kahnemann, 1973), and therefore a reader’s attention can only focus 
on the most salient objects (Shipp, 2004). When the search task becomes increasingly 
difficult, visual search performance deteriorates (Huang & Pashler, 2005), which would 
imply that our restriction to 100 news stories is extremely conservative, as memorizing and 
                                                            
4 Full data survivors are defined as a set of firms that are operational throughout the entire sample period 
(Rohleder et al., 2011). To test for survivorship bias, we follow Bu & Lacey (2007) and test for a statistically 
significant return difference of our sample compared to the complete sample (dead and alive) for the entire 
sample period (i.e., January 2004 to December 2012). However, in contrast to Bu & Lacey (2007), we do not 
include any firms that entered the ASX 200 after 31 December 2003 to avoid potential look-ahead bias. Further, 
instead of using a parametric t-test, we perform the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U and Sign test, since the 
underlying time series of returns are found to be not normally distributed, as evident in significant Jarque-Bera 
χ2-statistics. 
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recalling a wide array of news stories over multiple firms is a very difficult task. We then 
compute the reputational score as outlined in the section ‘Measurement of Media Tone’.  
The ensuing step is to collect monthly total returns for the companies. Monthly stock price 
data and dividend information is sourced from SIRCA and DatAnalysis. For the analysis, we 
use total arithmetic return defined as: ܴ௜,௠ ൌ 	 ሺ௉೟ା஽೟ሻ௉೟షభ െ 1. 5 We compile 108 monthly year-
ahead total return data observations from January 2004 through December 2012 for each of 
the 78 companies. This time horizon allows contrasting the profitability of our trading 
strategy during three distinct trading periods – (1) pre-crisis (January 2004 to December 
2006); (2) crisis (January 2007 to December 2009); and (3) post-crisis (January 2010 to 
December 2012) – to examine portfolio monthly risk-adjusted return performance across 
diverging market conditions. According to Maheu & McCurdy (2000) bull markets show 
high returns combined with low volatility, while bear markets are characterised by low 
returns and high return volatility (which is consistent with the data periods chosen in this 
study).  
Measurement of Media Tone  
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) was used to analyse how the content of each 
media article may affect the individual reader (Pennebaker et al., 2006). LIWC classifies the 
linguistic structure of a text by totalling the number of words coupled with a series of pre-
defined dictionaries. These comprise basic features such as pronoun or verb use, but also 
words associated with mental states such as emotions, beliefs and attitudes. Instead of using 
the pre-defined LIWC dictionary, we employ Loughran & McDonald’s (2011) Financial 
Sentiment Dictionaries. While the pre-defined LIWC dictionary detects linguistic 
measurements for positive versus negative emotion content expressed in the linguistic style, 
                                                            
5 Dividends used in the calculation of total returns are not inclusive of imputation credits. Total return includes 
ordinary and special dividends. 
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the Financial Sentiment Dictionaries obtain scores for positive and negative sentiment. This 
enables us to calculate the percentage of word matches with the word lists of the Financial 
Sentiment Dictionaries and determine the sentimental footprint of the company’s media 
coverage. For each firm-year considered across the sample, we obtain the ratio of positive 
tone (POSTONE) and negative tone (NEGTONE) to total word count.6 We then combine 
these two ratios into one singular media tone measure (MEDTONE) using the coefficient of 
imbalance formula as employed by Tong (2013):  
                          Coefficient of imbalance ൌ
ە
۔
ۓ௉
మି௉ே
்మ , ݂݅	ܲ ൐ ܰ;
0	,								݂݅	ܲ ൌ ܰ
௉ேିேమ
்మ 	݂݅	ܰ ൐ ܲ,
                                          (1) 
where P is the number of positive words, N the number of negative words, and T the total 
number of positive and negative words. The coefficient ranges from complete negative (-1) to 
complete positive (1) corporate reputation coverage. 
Empirical Analysis of Risk-adjusted Returns 
To test our hypotheses, we sort firms based on their lagged media tone score, i.e., we 
construct the portfolio according to the media tone score at the beginning of each year. For 
example, to construct the monthly reputation portfolios in 2004, we use the media tone score 
as of 31 December 2003. Then we form quartiles, but are primarily interested in the top and 
bottom quartiles (which represent firms with the best and worst corporate reputation during 
any given month, respectively). After sorting firms into portfolios, we compute equally-
weighted monthly portfolio returns. Following prior literature (e.g., Jegadeesh & Titman, 
                                                            
6 We confine our analyses to the Loughran & McDonald (2011) Financial Sentiment Dictionaries, as the more 
commonly used Harvard-IV-4 Psychological Dictionary incorrectly classifies negative words. In almost three-
fourths of the cases, the Harvard dictionary identifies words as negative, which are typically not considered 
negative in a financial context (Loughran & McDonald, 2011). For the same reason, we do not use the LIWC 
dictionary. Further, untabulated results show that the LIWC dictionary returns only a very small number of 
matches with their word lists of positive and negative emotional content, which may be attributable to the less 
emotional laden writing style of business news.  
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1993; Armstrong et al., 2011), equal weights for firms within each portfolio are assigned to 
avoid placing too much emphasis on larger firms. Equally-weighted portfolios are usually 
calculated by purchasing a portfolio, holding it for one month, and then re-balancing the 
portfolio so that it has equal weights at the start of each month. However, the concern with 
this approach is that frequent re-balancing can produce biased estimates of realised returns 
because of bid-ask bounce.  
To ensure that results are conservative and not subject to this bias, we compute returns to 
an equally-weighted ‘buy-and-hold’ portfolio that is re-balanced annually. Intuitively, using 
annual re-balancing suggests that corporate reputation is ‘sticky’, which implies that the 
public perception of a firm’s corporate reputation is not subject to short-term volatility. 
Furthermore, individual investors are usually passive investors that re-balance their portfolios 
less frequently than institutional investors. We refrain to use an extended time frame for 
portfolio construction, e.g., two to three years, as prior research has shown that retention 
performance of news stories (i.e., the ability of individuals to correctly recall the content of 
the news story) diminishes over time horizons greater than one year (Meeter et al., 2005). 
Next we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to control for market risk and to estimate 
risk-adjusted performance on the null hypothesis that corporate reputation has no effect on 
expected returns: 
ݎ௉,௧ ൌ ߙ௉ ൅ ߚଵ௉ܴܯܴܨ௧ ൅ ߚଶ௉ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷ௉ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚସ௉ܹܯܮ௧ ൅ ߝ௉,௧ (2) 
 
ݎ௉,௧ ൌ ߙ௉ ൅ ߙ௉ܥܴܫܵܫܵ ൅ ߙ௉ܱܲܵܶܥܴܫܵܫܵ ൅ ߚଵ௉ܴܯܴܨ௧ ൅ ߚଶ௉ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷ௉ܪܯܮ௧ 
       ൅ߚସ௉ܹܯܮ௧ ൅ ߝ௉,௧      (3) 
 
where rp,t is the monthly return minus the 30-day treasury bill return (risk-free rate) of the 
respective portfolio (e.g., top or bottom corporate reputation portfolio); RMRF is the excess 
return on the value-weighted accumulation index including all major Asia-Pacific stock 
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exchange stocks; and SMB, HML, and WML are returns on value-weighted zero-investment, 
factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in 
stock returns, respectively. To perform the asset pricing tests, we use local Asian-Pacific 
factors. For instance, Griffin (2002) suggests that local factors outperform global factors in 
explaining stock returns based on a sample of UK, Japanese and Canadian returns. We tested 
for serial correlation (up to 6 lags) using the Breusch-Godfrey test and for non-stationarity 
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Results show that there is no serial correlation or 
non-stationarity. Therefore, the model is run as originally proposed. 
To test Hypothesis 1, which assumes that a firm’s corporate reputation does not generate 
excessive returns universally, we estimate model (2) using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. The variable of interest is the estimated intercept ap. If ap is significantly greater 
than zero, firms with a higher/lower corporate reputation earn higher risk-adjusted returns 
than the market, respectively. To contrast the effectiveness of the devised trading strategy 
across the three sub-periods and test Hypotheses 2 to 4, we introduce two dummy variables 
into model (3), which are coded 1 if the observation was made during January 2007 to 
December 2009 (αCRISIS) or January 2010 to December 2012 (αPOST-CRISIS), 
respectively. We do not introduce an additional dummy variable for the pre-crisis period to 
avoid running into the dummy variable trap. In this setting, the original intercept represents 
the pre-crisis period (αPRE-CRISIS).  
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed trading strategy in determining whether it 
significantly outperforms the ASX 200, we use cross-model comparisons.7 For testing 
whether any of the MEDTONE portfolios outperforms the ASX 200, we replicate the 
                                                            
7 While excess returns beyond those explained by a factor model (including the returns of a market-mimicking 
portfolio (RMRF)) already demonstrates that a particular strategy out or underperforms the market, we chose the 
cross-model approach for a direct comparison with ASX 200 returns, particularly given that the RMRF factor 
provided by Fama & French encompasses multi-markets across the Asia-Pacific region.  
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previous analysis using the ASX 200 monthly total return less the risk-free rate as the 
dependent variable. We then estimate the simultaneous co-variance matrix of the ASX 200 
model and the respective top/bottom portfolio model using a seemingly unrelated regression. 
The cross-model approach allows us to compare the correlation coefficients and intercepts 
across the portfolio and the ASX model, where a χ2 test statistic indicates significant 
differences. Of main interest here is whether the intercepts (overall and for each sub-period) 
significantly differ between our trading portfolios and the ASX 200. The cross-model 
comparison also allows us to directly test whether the returns of the bottom portfolio are 
significantly different from the top portfolio.  
To complement the evaluation of abnormal risk-adjusted return performance of the 
specified portfolios, we also test whether there is a firm-specific exposure to corporate 
reputation using the following fixed-effects (FE) regression approach:  
ݎ௜,௧ െ ܴܨ௧ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ௜ܵ݅ݖ݁௧ ൅ ܾଶ௜ܤܶܯ௧ ൅ ܾଷ௜ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൅ ܾସ௜ܴܲ6ܯ௧ ൅ 
														ܾହ௜ܯܧܦܱܶܰܧ௧ିଵ ൅ 	ܾ଺௜ܥܴܫܵܫܵ ൅ 	ܾ଻௜ܱܲܵܶܥܴܫܵܫܵ ൅ ܽ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                               (4) 
ݎ௜,௧ െ ܴܨ௧ ൌ
ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ௜ܵ݅ݖ݁௧ ൅ ܾଶ௜ܤܶܯ௧ ൅ ܾଷ௜ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܴ݅ݏ݇௧ ൅ ܾସ௜ܴܲ6ܯ௧ ൅ ܾହ௜ܯܧܦܱܶܰܧ௧ିଵ ൅
ܾ଺௜ܥܴܫܵܫܵ ൅ ܾ଻௜ܱܲܵܶܥܴܫܵܫܵ ൅ ଼ܾ௜ܥܴܫܵܫܵ ∗ ܯܧܦܱܶܰܧ௧ିଵ ൅	ܾଽ௜ܱܲܵܶܥܴܫܵܫܵ ∗
							ܯܧܦܱܶܰܧ௧ ൅ ܽ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                                                                                                     (5) 
where the annualized return of firm i minus the risk-free rate is regressed on our measure of 
corporate reputation (MEDTONE) and other known determinants of stock returns. We chose 
to estimate models (4) and (5) using FE estimators, since we cannot rule out the possibility 
that unobserved individual differences between firms affect the results (ai in equations 4 and 
5). While it could be argued that FE estimators are preferred over random-effects (RE) 
estimators on the basis that unobservable variables such as management style are likely to be 
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highly correlated with our corporate reputation measure, we also empirically tested whether 
FE estimators are favored to the RE specification. We used the Hausman specification test, in 
which the null hypothesis (H0) is that the RE specification is the appropriate specification 
versus the alternative hypothesis (H1) that the FE specification is appropriate. Based on the 
Hausman test results for the overall effect (Panel A) and the period-specific effect (Panel B), 
we found that the null hypothesis is rejected. We, therefore, concluded that the FE model is 
the appropriate – and hence our preferred – specification. We also clustered standard errors 
by firm in both instances, so that estimates are robust to observations being potentially 
correlated within firms. 
In model (4), we include firm size as measured by the market value of equity (Size), and 
book-to-market-ratio (BTM), constructed as the book value per share divided by the market 
value of equity per share at the end of the financial year. Market risk (i.e., beta) is estimated 
using weekly returns over the two years prior to the end of financial year t (Fama & French, 
1993); and momentum (PR6M) is calculated as the stock return six months prior to the 
financial year-end (Carhart, 1997). We also control for any time-specific effects by including 
a dummy variable for each distinct time period: CRISIS is coded 1 if the observation pertains 
to the calendar year 2007, 2008, or 2009, 0 otherwise; and POST-CRISIS is coded 1 if the 
observation belongs to the calendar years 2010, 2011 or 2012, 0 otherwise.  
If a firm’s corporate reputation reliably predicts future firm returns, then there should be a 
significant positive relation of our MEDTONE measure with future returns. In model (5), we 
introduce two interaction terms of our MEDTONE variable with time dummy variables, 
CRISIS and POST-CRISIS, to investigate the corporate reputation effect conditional upon the 
respective time period. As with model (4), we expect a positive association of our return 
measure with the interaction terms, for our trading strategy to perform well in each sub-
period. However, for both models it should be noted that to replicate the returns implied by 
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the coefficients, the investment strategy would have to take a small positive or negative 
position in every firm. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Table 1 we provide a summary of the market-adjusted returns of the corporate reputation 
strategy for our sample of ASX 200 firms. Stocks are ranked based on their MEDTONE score 
and allocated into quartiles for each year, and a hedge portfolio is formed that is long in the 
most positive MEDTONE stocks and short in the most negative MEDTONE stocks. The 
average of quartile returns are adjusted for the ASX 200 ‘Total Return’ index. Panel A shows 
the performance of each corporate reputation portfolio and of our trading strategy across the 
entire observation period for one-, three-, six- and twelve- months forward. Overall, we find 
that our strategy generates marginal negative market adjusted returns for the one- and three-
month periods (-0.59% and -1.33%, respectively). However, buying stocks with the best 
corporate reputation and shorting stocks with the worst significantly underperforms over a 
holding period of six to twelve months, with a negative return of -2.70% and -6.50% (t-stat = 
-4.281, p < 0.001).  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
In Panel B, performance is broken down into each of the three distinct sub-periods of our 
sampling period. Panel B shows similar results to Panel A, but the spread decreases gradually 
from the pre-crisis to post-crisis period. While our trading strategy generates significantly 
negative three-, six- and twelve-month forward returns in the pre-crisis period (t = -2.217, p < 
0.05; t = -3.217, p < 0.01 and t = -3.962, p < 0.001, respectively), during the crisis period 
only the twelve-month forward return spread between the bottom portfolio and the top 
portfolio is significantly different from zero (t = 3.903, p < 0.001). By contrast, none of the 
forward return spreads are significantly different during the post-crisis period. While this 
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precursory analysis shows that there might be significant differences in return performance 
for firms with good versus bad corporate reputation, it should be kept in mind that these 
differences may disappear when adjusting for factors such as risk and size. Therefore, we 
analyse risk-adjusted performance next.   
For our trading strategy, we divide our sample into top and bottom quartiles according to 
MEDTONE scores and run the Carhart model using the Asia-Pacific factors provided on 
Kenneth French’s website. The results are presented in Table 2. As shown in Panel A, Table 
2 the top portfolio only loads significantly on market risk, which is consistent with capital 
asset pricing theory (MktRFTOP = 0.46, p < 0.001). Compared to the returns of the ASX 200, 
broader market investment is preferred. The same also applies to the bottom portfolio 
(MktRFBOTTOM = 0.465, p < 0.001).  
In addition, the alpha in the bottom portfolio is significant which indicates that the bottom 
portfolio generates excess returns above and beyond returns that are explained by common 
factors such as market risk, size, value or momentum (α = 0.012, p < 0.05). This finding 
suggests that our trading strategy that goes long in firms with good corporate reputation and 
short sells firms with bad corporate reputation, in fact, underperformed across the entire time 
period examined. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The same analysis was then conducted with period-specific alpha factors. In Panel B of 
Table 2, we see that in addition to market risk, past return performance significantly explains 
the returns of the bottom portfolio (WML = -0.366, p < 0.05). The negative WML coefficient 
indicates that the bottom portfolio is inherently contrarian, i.e., investing into companies with 
low past return performance yields significant return outperformance the following year (and 
vice-versa).  
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The findings show that significant excess returns in the bottom portfolio are mainly 
attributable to a positive alpha throughout the pre-crisis period, suggesting that during bull 
markets risk appetite is heightened (αPRE-CRISISBottom = 0.025, p < 0.01), while the top 
portfolio also significantly outperforms in the pre-crisis period (αPRE-CRISISTop = 0.012, p < 
0.01). These findings indicate that qualitative aspects, like corporate reputation, appear to 
contribute to their return performance and therefore should be taken into consideration by 
investors. Turning our attention to the alpha factors that represent the crisis and post-crisis 
periods, we find that the bottom portfolio underperforms on a risk-adjusted basis, supporting 
the contrarian nature of the strategy (αCRISISBottom = -0.026, p < 0.05). Therefore, corporate 
reputation may be a driver of future return performance (which is examined further in the 
following analyses).8  
To put this finding into perspective, we, in fact, provide a close-up insight into the study 
by Fang & Peress (2009) who argue that firms with high media coverage do not generate 
risk-adjusted returns compared to firms with low media coverage. Using only companies with 
high media-visibility, we show that this conjecture is only true if media coverage is neutral. 
Contrasting the relationship between corporate reputation and investment performance across 
divergent market conditions, we find evidence that literature suggesting a positive association 
between their measure of corporate reputation and return performance (e.g., Pfarrer et al., 
2010) may be an artefact of the period under study. Compared to companies with good 
reputation, poor corporate reputation seems to be inherently more risky given the more 
pronounced swings in return performance across market conditions. 
In Table 3, Panels A, B and C, we present the results of the top and bottom corporate 
reputation portfolios, and with the ASX 200, respectively. Notably, the findings reflect the 
                                                            
8 The results from the pooled regression with the linear time trend show that the coefficients for the Pre-Crisis, 
Crisis and Post-Crisis periods differ from the similar coefficients from the seemingly unrelated regressions for 
the 'bottom and  top portfolio groups. As such, the results may be driven by the way the time trend is modeled. 
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results discussed in Table 2. For example, Panel B shows that the top corporate reputation 
portfolio significantly differs on the HML and marginally on the WML loadings from the 
ASX 200 based on local factors (HML χ2 = 4.24, p < 0.05; WML χ2 = 3.16, p = 0.075). It 
appears that the top portfolio is more value orientated than the ASX 200, which indicates that 
the portfolio contains more firms with higher book-to-market ratios. Further, we find that the 
return of the past performance mimicking portfolio is marginally correlated with the returns 
of the top portfolio. However, contradictory to expectations, we find that the association is 
negative, which suggests that investing in the top reputation firms is also contrarian in nature.  
In turn, Panel C shows that the significant χ2 on the comparison of the WML factor loading 
suggests that an investment in the bottom portfolio is indeed a contrarian strategy (WML = -
0.366, p < 0.001). The risky nature is also reflected in the comparison of the ASX 200 risk-
adjusted with the bottom portfolio returns, demonstrating that even after controlling for the 
short-run opportunity in investing in the ASX 200 index, we can generate risk-adjusted 
returns beyond common risk factors that are associated with the corporate reputation of a 
firm.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
In lieu of Australian factor loadings, the final testing complements the previous portfolio 
return tests to assess whether corporate reputation has the capability to predict stock returns 
based on purely Australian data. Table 4 presents the results of these tests. The first 
regression in Panel A shows a significantly negative relation with firm size (Size), which 
corresponds with prior evidence that small firms generate greater returns compared to larger 
companies. Future returns correlate with Market risk in the expected direction, however, this 
relation is not significant in explaining future returns.  
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The association with the book-to-market ratio (BTM) and the momentum factor (PR6M) 
shows that it is not consistent with prior capital asset pricing studies. The significantly 
negative association of future annual returns with PR6M exhibits an underlying contrarian 
attitude in explaining future outperformance with past underperformance. The negative 
relation with value (BTM), while not significant, suggests that investors attach greater risk to 
growth stocks rather than value stocks over the examined sample period. This observation 
may reflect the characteristics of the underlying sample period, which due to the recent 
financial crisis may not align with prior evidence from non-crisis periods. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In our sample, future one-year forward return is significantly negatively related to prior 
return and is negatively associated with MEDTONE after controlling for common 
determinants of stock performance and time-specific effects, supporting the main findings 
from Table 2. Contrary to our expectations, this result suggests that higher future returns are 
associated with lower corporate reputation, highlighting the contrarian nature of the trading 
strategy established above. In Panel B, examining the time-specific effect of MEDTONE by 
interacting the MEDTONE ranking with the CRISIS and POST-CRISIS variables 
demonstrates that this trading strategy is mainly attributable to the risk-appetite prior to the 
crisis, as represented in the significantly negative coefficient on MEDTONE (Coef. = -0.031, 
p < 0.05). This finding represents the relation of future returns with corporate reputation after 
controlling for the effect of MEDTONE during the crisis (CRISIS*MEDTONE) and after the 
crisis (POST-CRISIS*MEDTONE).  
CONCLUSION 
This paper empirically examines whether investors are able to generate abnormal risk-
adjusted returns in the Australian market based on media-specific firm reputational factors 
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under market uncertainty. Results show that firms with poor corporate reputation 
outperformed the market in the combined period under investigation but are mainly driven by 
positive returns in the pre-GFC period. However, positive returns for poor corporate 
reputation firms significantly reversed in the GFC and post-GFC periods. Thus, investing in 
the broader market and/or short selling the risky bottom corporate reputation portfolio would 
have proved to be a more successful approach during these periods. The findings also 
indicate that after controlling for crisis-centric time periods and standard market risk factors, 
contrarian trading strategies produce abnormal returns for poor corporate reputation firms but 
not for their good corporate reputation counterparts.  
The poor reputation portfolio may have delivered higher returns due to the inherent risks 
associated with companies that are negatively framed by the media and/or have weak 
relations with the media, investment and broader communities; thus, supporting modern 
portfolio theory (Fama, 1998; Fama & MacBeth, 1973; Markowitz, 1959; Sharpe, 1964). For 
instance, the poor reputation portfolio was riskier than the good reputation portfolio, and thus, 
delivered higher/lower returns under favourable/unfavourable economic conditions.  
Further, the results of this study are consistent with the work of DeBondt & Thaler (1985). 
DeBondt & Thaler’s ‘overreaction’ hypothesis purports that stock markets are mean-reverting 
over longer time horizons and that prior stock market ‘losers’ are better investments than 
prior ‘winners’. This phenomenon implies that media framing conveys qualitative 
information that is not yet incorporated into the stock prices of poor reputation firms. As 
such, corporate reputation may be a driver of performance for poorly performing Australian 
firms and could be considered a stimulus for trading activity due to its explanatory 
capabilities.  
Our study is the first to test return performance for a selection of firms according to a 
corporate reputation measure that quantifies how Australian companies are presented 
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(‘framed’) in the media. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on whether a favourable 
corporate reputation leads to higher abnormal risk-adjusted returns in an Australian market 
context, and across divergent market conditions. It extends research (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock 
et al., 2008) that public information conveyed through the media can be useful in predicting 
future financial performance. However, unlike Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008), who 
examine market sentiment, we empirically examine individual firm reputation and whether 
affective tone influences share price performance.  
Moreover, the study adds to our understanding of the association of investment returns and 
corporate reputation by challenging the efficient market and investor sentiment hypotheses 
and other findings in the existing literature. For instance, studies suggest that corporate 
reputation is positively associated with investor returns (Barber & Odean, 2008; Eccles & 
Vollbracht, 2006; Frieder & Subrahmanyam, 2005; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; 
Wei et al., 2013). Yet, it should be borne in mind that the findings presented here may be a 
result of our corporate reputation measure. Future research is, therefore, encouraged to 
replicate our approach within different time periods and samples to provide a better 
understanding of the relationship between corporate reputation (as presented in the media) 
and return performance. 
The study also contributes to modern asset pricing theory in that it examines the 
performance of a speculative corporate reputation-driven trading strategy before, during and 
after a crisis period which is not yet well understood in the literature. For example, we show 
that divergent market conditions can moderate the effect of corporate reputation on stock 
returns. Our findings are of particular relevance for investors and firms interested in whether 
media image of a firm is, in fact, a valuable resource, reflecting the public recognition of the 
firm’s underlying capabilities and providing a precursor to separate ‘winners’ from ‘losers’. 
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One limitation of the study is the ability of an investment strategy based on corporate 
reputation to consistently generate above-average returns above a naïve buy-and-hold 
approach, as the strategy yielded inconsistent returns across different market conditions for 
both top and bottom corporate reputation portfolios. As such, investors should be cautious in 
relying how companies are framed in the media when investing. Also, transaction costs are 
ignored in examining the performance of the top and bottom portfolios. Transaction costs 
may affect risk-adjusted returns and overall profitability of the trading strategy.  
The risk-adjusted return performance of the ‘combined’ top and bottom portfolios was 
also not considered. The investment characteristics of the respective portfolios appear to be 
consistent with modern portfolio theory. For example, the poor reputation portfolio was 
riskier than the good reputation portfolio, and hence, provided higher/lower returns under 
favourable/unfavourable economic conditions. Using this rationale it is hypothesized that an 
equally-weighted portfolio comprising both poor and good reputation companies should 
achieve better risk-adjusted returns, regardless of market conditions. Therefore, an avenue for 
future research is the effect of transaction costs on the profitability of the trading strategy in 
Australia and abroad, while simultaneously combining top and bottom corporate reputation 
portfolios to illustrate potential diversification benefits. Such research will further develop 
our understanding of this interesting capital market phenomenon, improve the marketability 
of the trading strategy and encourage similar innovative trading strategies. 
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FIGURE 1 
Sector distribution of ASX 200 companies included in the sample 
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TABLE 1 
Time-series Mean of Market-adjusted Returns for Each Portfolio One Year after Portfolio 
Formation (January 2004 to December 2012) 
    
One-month 
forward 
return 
Three-month 
forward 
return 
Six-month 
forward return 
Twelve-month 
forward return 
  MEDTONE quartile (N=108) (N=106) (N=103) (N=97) 
Panel A – ASX 200 stocks over entire sample period (January 2004 - December 2012) 
1 (Bottom) 0.73% 1.73% 3.40% 7.26% 
2 -0.21% -0.70% -1.45% -3.16% 
3 -0.15% -0.40% -0.71% -1.72% 
4 (Top) 0.15% 0.39% 0.70% 0.76% 
Spread (4-1) -0.59% -1.33% -2.70%*** -6.50%*** 
t-stat.           (-1.267)          (-1.773)             (-2.629)                (-4.281) 
Panel B – ASX 200 stocks over the three sub-periods 
PR
E-
C
RI
SI
S 1 (Bottom) 0.84% 2.56% 5.23% 8.88% 
2 0.05% -0.11% -0.52% -3.66% 
3 0.03% 0.12% 0.19% -1.30% 
4 (Top) 0.00% -0.14% -0.08% -1.41% 
Spread (4-1) -0.85% -2.70%* -5.31%** -10.29%*** 
t-stat. (-1.206) (-2.217) (-3.217) (-3.962) 
C
RI
SI
S 
1 (Bottom) 0.43% 1.29% 3.26% 10.74% 
2 -0.22% -0.65% -1.42% -1.96% 
3 -0.53% -1.56% -2.88% -5.29% 
4 (Top) 0.25% 0.76% 1.21% 2.92% 
Spread (4-1) -0.19% -0.53% -2.06% -7.83%*** 
t-stat. (-0.255) (0.394) (-1.285) (-3.903) 
PO
ST
-C
RI
SI
S 1 (Bottom) 0.92% 1.31% 1.42% -0.09% 
2 -0.47% -1.38% -2.57% -4.18% 
3 0.04% 0.26% 0.76% 2.81% 
4 (Top) 0.19% 0.56% 1.01% 0.77% 
Spread (4-1) -0.73% -0.75% -0.40% 0.87% 
  t-stat. (-0.754) (-0.549) (-0.195) (0.275) 
Note. Four portfolios are formed based on the firm MEDTONE ranking at the beginning of each calendar year. 
In order to avoid look-ahead bias, return calculation is commenced one month after the observation of 
MEDTONE. ASX 200 ‘Total Return’ index is used as the benchmark. Returns reported in the table are 
calculated as the rolling one-, three-, six- and twelve-month ahead returns of each portfolio as: ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ
݆ܽ݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊௣,் ൌ ∏ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ௉,௧ሻ௧ െ ∏ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ஻,௧ሻ௧  , where ܴ௣,௧ is the return of the portfolio in month t, ܴ௕,௧ 
is the return on the ASX 200, and t equals 1, 3, 6 or 12, respectively, depending on the length of the period 
under study. Reported t-statistic tests whether the forward returns of the top portfolio are significantly different 
from the forward returns of the bottom portfolio. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 2 
Risk-adjusted Return Performance of Top and Bottom MEDTONE Portfolios 
Panel A – Risk-adjusted performance for the overall sampling period 
TOP  BOTTOM 
VARIABLES Coefficient   SE t-stat. p-val. VARIABLES Coefficient   SE t-stat. p-val. 
MktRF 0.460 *** (0.077) 5.971  0.000  MktRF 0.465 *** (0.082) 5.695  0.000  
SMB -0.144 (0.156) -0.926 0.357  SMB -0.266 (0.190) -1.399 0.165  
HML -0.092 (0.139) -0.667 0.506  HML -0.202 (0.208) -0.971 0.334  
WML -0.031 (0.107) -0.290 0.773  WML -0.298 (0.161) -1.848 0.067  
α  0.004 (0.004) 1.098 0.275  α  0.012 * (0.006) 2.013 0.047  
Observations 108 Observations 108 
R-squared 0.449 R-squared 0.307 
Adj. R2 0.427         Adj. R2 0.280         
Panel B – Risk-adjusted performance for sub-periods of sampling period 
TOP (pre-GFC, GFC, post-GFC) BOTTOM (pre-GFC, GFC, post-GFC)     
VARIABLES Coefficient   SE t-stat. p-val. VARIABLES Coefficient   SE t-stat. p-val. 
MktRF 0.450 *** (0.074) 6.119 0.000 MktRF 0.445 *** (0.078) 5.683 0.000 
SMB -0.140 (0.155) -0.906 0.367 SMB -0.257 (0.184) -1.393 0.167 
HML -0.107 (0.140) -0.763 0.447 HML -0.234 (0.205) -1.141 0.257 
WML -0.059 (0.108) -0.546 0.586 WML -0.366 * (0.159) -2.297 0.024 
PRE-CRISIS α  0.012 ** (0.005) 2.647 0.009 PRE-CRISIS α  0.025 ** (0.008) 3.334 0.001 
CRISIS α  -0.013 (0.009) -1.382 0.170 CRISIS α  -0.026 * (0.010) -2.607 0.011 
POST-CRISIS α  -0.011 (0.006) -1.966 0.052 POST-CRISIS α  -0.013 (0.012) -1.085 0.280 
Observations 108 Observations 108 
R-squared 0.464 R-squared 0.336 
Adj. R2 0.432         Adj. R2 0.296         
Note. This table presents the results of applying the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to estimate risk-adjusted returns (α factor) for the top and bottom MEDTONE quartiles. The 
factors used in the model are: MktRF = average return of market-mimicking portfolio less risk-free rate, SMB = average return on equal-weighted small stock portfolio minus the 
average return on equal-weighted large stock portfolio. HML = average return on equal-weighted portfolio on growth stock portfolio (high BTM) minus the average return on 
equal-weighted value stock portfolio (low BTM). WML = average return on equal-weighted portfolio of winner portfolio (high previous 12-month return) minus the average 
return on equal-weighted portfolio of loser portfolio (low previous 12-month return performance). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Tested for serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey with up to 6 lags) and non-stationarity (augmented Dickey-Fuller). Results show that there is no serial correlation or non-
stationarity. Therefore, model is run as originally proposed.  
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TABLE 3 
Coefficient Comparison with Top and Bottom MEDTONE Portfolios and ASX 200 
Panel A - Top MEDTONE portfolio versus bottom MEDTONE portfolio 
Coefficients Top Bottom Chi2   p-val. 
MktRF 0.450 0.445 0.00   (.953) 
SMB -0.140 -0.257 0.77   (.379) 
HML -0.107 -0.234 0.62   (.430) 
WML -0.059 -0.366 7.44 ** (.006) 
PRE-CRISIS α 0.012 0.025 3.73   (.053) 
CRISIS α -0.013 -0.026 1.95   (.163) 
POST-CRISIS α -0.011 -0.013 0.05   (.831) 
            
Panel B - Top MEDTONE portfolio versus ASX 200 
Coefficients Top ASX 200 Chi2   p-val. 
MktRF 0.450 0.507 0.93   (.334) 
SMB -0.140 -0.232 1.01   (.315) 
HML -0.107 -0.274 4.24 * (.040) 
WML -0.059 0.059 3.16   (.075) 
PRE-CRISIS α 0.012 0.010 0.56   (.453) 
CRISIS α -0.013 -0.012 0.01   (.916) 
POST-CRISIS α -0.011 -0.012 0.10   (.749) 
            
Panel C - Bottom MEDTONE portfolio versus ASX 200      
Coefficients Bottom ASX 200 Chi2   p-val. 
MktRF 0.445 0.507 0.88   (.347) 
SMB -0.257 -0.232 0.03   (.859) 
HML -0.234 -0.274 0.07   (.796) 
WML -0.366 0.059 11.93 *** (.001) 
PRE-CRISIS α 0.025 0.010 5.71 * (.017) 
CRISIS α -0.026 -0.012 3.31   (.069) 
POST-CRISIS α -0.013 -0.012 0.01   (.911) 
Note. This table reports the results of the cross-model comparison of model (4) using a seemingly 
unrelated regression. Panel A reports the results of comparing the top portfolio performance with the 
bottom portfolio performance. Panels B and C present the results of comparing the top (bottom) 
MEDTONE portfolio with the ASX 200 performance. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 4 
Prediction of Future One Year Annualised Returns 
Panel A – Fixed effects regression of one-year ahead annualised return on MEDTONE and 
control variables (Overall effect) 
VARIABLES Coefficient       SE t-stat. p-val. 
Size -0.026 *** (0.004) -7.235 0.000 
BTM 0.010 (0.005) 1.824 0.069 
Market risk 0.001 (0.003) 0.375 0.708 
PR6M -0.018 *** (0.005) -3.461 0.001 
MEDTONE -0.028 ** (0.011) -2.683 0.007 
CRISIS -0.016 *** (0.003) -4.677 0.000 
POST-CRISIS -0.014 *** (0.004) -3.813 0.000 
Intercept 0.588 *** (0.080) 7.312 0.000 
Observations 700 
R2 0.258 
Number of firms  78 
adj. R2 0.157         
Panel B – Fixed effects regression of one-year ahead annualised return on MEDTONE and 
control variables (Period-specific effect) 
VARIABLES Coefficient       SE t-stat. p-val. 
Size -0.026 *** (0.004) -7.275 0.000 
BTM 0.009 (0.005) 1.684 0.093 
Market risk 0.001 (0.003) 0.429 0.668 
PR6M -0.018 *** (0.005) -3.419 0.001 
MEDTONE -0.031 * (0.015) -2.043 0.041 
CRISIS -0.017 *** (0.004) -4.247 0.000 
POST-CRISIS -0.008 (0.005) -1.716 0.087 
CRISIS*MEDTONE -0.010 (0.020) -0.482 0.630 
POST-CRISIS*MEDTONE 0.031 (0.024) 1.302 0.193 
Intercept  0.591 *** (0.080) 7.352 0.000 
Observations 700 
R2 0.262 
Number of firms 78 
adj. R2 0.158         
Note. The full sample consists of 700 firm-year observations in year t from 2004 to 2012. One 
year-forward return is the annualised monthly returns for year t. Size = market capitalisation in 
year t-1. BTM = Book-to-market ratio at the end of year t-1. Market risk = correlation coefficient 
of regressing weekly returns of firm i for the past 2 years on the weekly market (ASX 200) returns 
prior to t-1. PR6M = return performance over the six months prior to t-1. MEDTONE = coefficient 
of media tone. CRISIS = 1 if observation is made in 2007, 2008, or 2009, 0 otherwise. POST-
CRISIS = 1 if observation is made in 2010, 2011, or 2012, 0 otherwise. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
